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Abstract
We model a homogeneous product environment where identical e-retailers endogenously
engage in both brand advertising (to create loyal customers) and price advertising (to attract
￿shoppers￿ ). Our analysis allows for ￿cross-channel￿e⁄ects between brand and price adver-
tising. In contrast to models where loyalty is exogenous, these cross-channel e⁄ects lead to a
continuum of symmetric equilibria; however, the set of equilibria converges to a unique equi-
librium as the number of potential e-retailers grows arbitrarily large. Price dispersion is a
key feature of all of these equilibria, including the limit equilibrium. While each ￿rm ￿nds it
optimal to advertise its brand in an attempt to ￿grow￿its base of loyal customers, in equilib-
rium, branding (1) reduces ￿rm pro￿ts, (2) increases prices paid by loyals and shoppers, and
(3) adversely a⁄ects gatekeepers operating price comparison sites. Branding also tightens the
range of prices and reduces the value of the price information provided by a comparison site.
Using data from a price comparison site, we test several predictions of the model. JEL Nos:
D4, D8, M3, L13. Keywords: Price dispersion
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1 11 Introduction
The size, scope, and persistence of online price dispersion for seemingly identical products
has been amply documented.1 Some have suggested that, while the products sold at price
comparison sites may be identical and search costs low, e-retailers go to great pains to be
perceived as di⁄erent. For instance, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000a) argue that price dis-
persion in markets for books and CDs is mainly due to perceived di⁄erences among retailers
related to branding, awareness, and trust￿ factors in￿ uenced by the brand-building activities
of online retailers.2 These activities include the prominent use of logos, clever advertising
campaigns, the development of ￿customized￿applications including one-click ordering, cus-
tom recommendations, and the development of an online ￿community￿or ￿culture￿loyal
to a particular ￿rm.3 Even on Internet price comparison sites, where consumers are price
sensitive (Ellison and Ellison (2004) estimate price elasticities between ￿25 and ￿40 for
consumers on one such site), some ￿rms promote their ￿brand￿by featuring their logo along
with their price listing. All of these activities are costly.
How do costly di⁄erentiation e⁄orts￿ what we refer to as brand advertising￿ interact
with ￿rms￿pricing and listing decisions￿ what we refer to as informational advertising￿
to a⁄ect competition and price dispersion in online markets? The existing literature on
equilibrium price dispersion does not provide a ready answer; it typically treats the fraction
of consumers who are ￿loyal￿to some ￿rm as exogenous.4 One can imagine that endogenizing
1See, for instance, Bailey (1998a,b); Brown and Goolsbee (2000); Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000a, b);
Clemons, Hann, and Hitt (2002); Morton, Zettlemeyer, and Risso (2000); Baye and Morgan (2004); Chen
and Scholten (2003); Clay, Krishnan, and Wol⁄ (2001); Clay and Tay (2001); Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar
(2001); Smith (2001, 2002); Scholten and Smith (2002); Ellison and Ellison (2004); and Baye, Morgan, and
Scholten (2004). See also Elberse, et al. (2003) for a survey of the relevant marketing literature, and Ellison
and Ellison (2005) for a survey of the industrial organization literature. There is also a growing experimental
literature on price dispersion; see Abrams, Sefton and Yavas (2000), Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), and
Cason and Friedman (2003).
2See also Ward and Lee (2000) and Dellarocas (2004).
3E⁄orts to induce loyalty may also be indirect. The cost of such strategies include the implicit costs
of providing fast service or liberal returns policies in an attempt to in￿ uence reputational ratings (see
Bayliss and Perlo⁄, 2002; Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002). It appears that these brand-building activities are
somewhat successful. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000b) report that a considerable fraction of consumers do
not click-through to the lowest price book retailer at one price comparison site.
4Examples include Shilony (1977), Varian (1980), Rosenthal (1980), Narasimhan (1988), Stegeman (1991),
Robert and Stahl (1993), Dana (1994), Stahl (1994), Banerjee and Kovenock (1999), Roy (2000), Baye-
Morgan (2001), and Janssen and Rasmusen (2002). See also Butters (1977); Grossman and Shapiro (1984),
McAfee (1994), Stahl (1994), Hong, McAfee, and Nayyar (2002), Baye and Morgan (2004) as well as Janssen
2brand-building might matter a great deal. If brand advertising ultimately converted all
consumers into ￿loyals,￿￿rms would ￿nd it optimal to charge the ￿monopoly￿price and
price dispersion would vanish. Expressed di⁄erently, it is not at all clear that dispersed price
equilibria of the sort characterized in the extant literature (see footnote 4) survive when
customer loyalty is endogenously determined by ￿rms￿branding activities.
In Section 2, we o⁄er a model with endogenous branding and pricing that captures salient
features of competition among retailers at a price comparison site. In the model, a ￿xed
number of ￿rms sell similar products. In the ￿rst stage, each ￿rm invests in brand advertising
in an attempt to convert some or all consumers into ￿loyals.￿These branding decisions result
in an endogenous partition of consumers into ￿loyals￿ , who are loyal to a speci￿c ￿rm, and
￿shoppers￿ , who view the products to be identical. In the second stage, ￿rms independently
make pricing decisions as well as decisions about informational advertising. Thus, the model
entails endogenous branding, pricing, and informational advertising strategies.
We characterize all symmetric Nash equilibria and show that, in contrast to models where
the number of loyal consumers is exogenous, endogenous branding leads to multiple equi-
libria. Importantly however, behavior converges to a unique symmetric equilibrium as the
number of ￿rms grows arbitrarily large. In all equilibria￿ including the limit equilibrium￿
branding e⁄orts by ￿rms create a signi￿cant number of loyal consumers, but do not convert
all shoppers into loyals. As a consequence, endogenous branding does not eliminate equi-
librium price dispersion in online markets, although increased branding is associated with
lower levels of price dispersion. Branding not only increases the average prices paid by loyal
customers, but also raises the prices paid by shoppers who purchase at price comparison
sites. Branding also negatively impacts ￿gatekeepers￿operating price comparison sites in
two ways. First, ￿rms￿branding e⁄orts increase the number of loyal consumers and thereby
reduce tra¢ c at the price comparison site. (Interestingly, the gatekeeper cannot stem these
losses by reducing its fees.) Second, branding tightens the distribution of prices and, as a
consequence, reduces the value of price information provided by the site.
We also show that, even in the limit equilibrium where the number of potential com-
petitors is ￿large￿(as is the case in global online markets), prices remain dispersed above
and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004).
3marginal cost. This ￿nding is in contrast to the models of Varian (1980), Rosenthal (1980),
Narasimhan (1988), which all predict that price dispersion vanishes as the number of poten-
tial competitors grows large. Our ￿ndings for large online markets are broadly consistent
with daily data we have been collecting for several years and post weekly at our website,
Nash-Equilibrium.com. Price dispersion, as measured by the range in prices, has remained
quite stable over the past four years, at 35 to 40 percent. The stability and magnitude of
this dispersion is remarkable from a theoretical perspective, since (1) the products are rel-
atively expensive consumer electronics products for which the average price is about $500,
(2) over the period the Internet rapidly eliminated geographic boundaries, leading to expo-
nential growth in the number of consumers and businesses with direct Internet access, and
(3) according to the Census Bureau, there were nearly 10,000 consumer electronics retail
establishments in the United States who compete in the consumer electronics market.5 Our
model provides the ￿rst equilibrium rationale for how so many ￿rms could compete in such
a price sensitive arena and yet have prices remain dispersed above marginal cost.
Finally, we use data from Shopper.com to test some of the predictions of the model. We
￿nd that more intense branding by ￿rms is associated with lower levels of price dispersion
and higher prices to loyals and shoppers. These results are robust to a variety of controls.
2 Model
Consider an online market where a unit measure of consumers shop for a speci￿c product
(e.g., HP LaserJet 1100xi). There are N ￿ 2 sellers in this market, each having a constant
marginal cost of m:6 Each consumer is interested in purchasing at most one unit of the
product, from which she derives value v.7 As in Narasimhan and Rosenthal, there are
assumed to be two types of consumers: loyals and shoppers. Shoppers costlessly visit the
price comparison site to obtain a list of the prices charged by all ￿rms choosing to list their
5This ￿gure is based on NAICS classi￿cation code 443112, which is comprised of establishments known as
consumer electronics stores primarily engaged in retailing new consumer-type electronic products. Source:
U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 Economic Census, January 5, 2001, p. 217.
6The model readily extends to the case where there are positive ￿xed costs as well.
7It is straightforward to generalize the model to allow for downward sloping demand.
4prices there.8 Since shoppers view sellers as perfect substitutes, they each purchase at the
lowest price available at the price comparison site￿ provided it does not exceed v. If no
prices are listed, these shoppers visit the website of a randomly selected ￿rm and purchase if
the price does not exceed v.9 A fraction ￿ 2 [0;1] of loyals directly visit the website of their
preferred ￿rm. The remaining 1 ￿ ￿ of loyals ￿rst use the price comparison site to search
for their preferred seller, but if it is not listed, proceed to their preferred seller￿ s website.
This parameterization accommodates anecdotal evidence that in some online markets it
is easier for loyals to purchase from their preferred ￿rm through the price comparison site.
Among other things, search capabilities and product reviews are often superior at comparison
sites than at individual ￿rm websites. In addition, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000a) provide
evidence that some loyal consumers visit sellers￿websites directly, while other loyal consumers
purchase through links at price comparison sites. Baye, Gatti, Kattuman, and Morgan (2005)
observe similar patterns, and estimate that nearly 90 percent of consumers at the leading
price comparison site in the UK are, in fact, loyal. Note, however, that since loyals always
buy from their preferred seller, equilibrium prices and pro￿ts turn out to be independent of
￿:
In contrast to the models of Narasimhan and Rosenthal, a consumer￿ s type is determined
endogenously by brand advertising on the part of ￿rms, as we will describe below. In contrast
to Baye and Morgan (2001), who assume that all consumers view ￿rms as identical, here we
allow for the possibility that some consumers have a preference for particular sellers. There
is considerable evidence that this is indeed the case. For instance, many consumers prefer
to purchase books from Amazon rather than Barnes and Noble￿ even at higher prices.10
To capture these e⁄ects, let ￿i denote the proportion of consumers who are loyal to ￿rm i.
Thus, the total measure of consumers loyal to some ￿rm is B =
PN
i=1 ￿i. The remaining
8Baye and Morgan (2001) show that a monopoly ￿gatekeeper￿that owns a price comparison site has an
incentive to set consumer subscription fees su¢ ciently low in an attempt to induce all consumers to utilize
the site. Hence, we assume that all shoppers have access to the comparison site at no cost. This assumption
is consistent with empirical evidence; virtually all price comparison sites￿ including Shopper.com, Nextag,
Expedia, and Travelocity￿ permit consumers to use their services at no charge. See also Caillaud and Jullien
(2002, 2003) for analysis of competition among gatekeepers.
9The analysis that follows implies the existence of a search cost, ￿ < v , such that this behavior comprises
an optimal sequential search strategy.
10For instance, Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) provide evidence that the demand for books at Barnes and
Noble is about 8 times more elastic than that at Amazon.
51 ￿ B shoppers view the sellers as identical.
There are three components to a ￿rm￿ s strategy: Firm i must decide its price (denoted
pi), its informational advertising strategy, which is modeled as a binary decision to spend
￿ > 0 to list its price on the price comparison site (or not), and its brand advertising level,
ai: Firms in￿ uence consumers￿loyalty through brand advertising. We assume that branding
leads to the acquisition of loyal customers according to the functional form:






A￿i+ai + ai￿ if ai + A￿i > 0
￿




j6=i aj denotes aggregate branding e⁄ort by all ￿rms other than i, and where
￿ > 0 and 1 > ￿ > 0 are parameters. When A￿i > 0; positive branding e⁄ort is required
for ￿rm i to enjoy any loyal consumers. The ￿￿￿term in equation (1) captures potential
￿brand stealing￿e⁄ects of brand advertising￿ brand advertising that steals loyal customers
from other sellers. The ￿￿￿ term captures ￿brand expansion￿ e⁄ects￿ brand advertising
that converts some shoppers into loyals. The form of equation (1) is standard in the contest
literature; see Nitzan (1994) for a survey.
Firms￿incentives to engage in branding activities depend not only on the sensitivity of ￿i
to branding e⁄orts (that is, the magnitude of ￿;￿; and the aggregate branding e⁄orts of rival
￿rms), but also on brand advertising costs. We assume that the marginal cost of a unit of
brand advertising is ￿ > 0; so that the total cost to ￿rm i of ai units of brand advertising is





, which merely guarantees that aggregate branding
e⁄orts do not lead to more loyals than is feasible given the unit mass of consumers and the
speci￿cation in equation (1):
In many online markets, ￿rms adjust prices frequently and quickly, and there is consid-
erable turnover in the identity of the ￿rm o⁄ering the lowest price; for evidence, see Ellison
and Ellison (2005) as well as Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004). In contrast, branding
decisions typically require substantial up-front investments, which take time to mature into
a sizeable base of loyal customers. Hence, we model branding and pricing decisions as a
two-stage game. In the ￿rst stage, ￿rms simultaneously choose brand advertising levels, ai;
in an attempt to create a stock of loyal consumers. In the second stage, after having observed
￿rst stage decisions, ￿rms simultaneously make pricing and listing decisions.
63 Equilibrium Branding, Pricing, and Listing Decisions
The structure of our model attempts to capture the ￿strategic uncertainty￿present in ￿rms￿
branding and pricing decisions. In particular, the value to a ￿rm committing up-front re-
sources on branding activity critically depends on its view of the competitiveness of the
market for shoppers in the second-stage game. As we show in Proposition 1, the strategic
uncertainty present in this setting leads to a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria. How-
ever, as Proposition 3 shows, the multiplicity issue turns out to be moot in markets where
the number of competing ￿rms is su¢ ciently large. Speci￿cally, we show that (1) there exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium in which players employ secure branding strategies,11 and
(2) all symmetric equilibria converge to the unique equilibrium in secure branding strate-
gies as the number of competing ￿rms grow arbitrarily large. As will be apparent in our
characterization equilibria, it is useful to de￿ne
aL ￿
1























We focus on equilibria in which ￿rms employ both informational and brand advertising.
Obviously, this requires that the informational advertising channel be su¢ ciently attractive
that ￿rms ￿nd it in their interest to periodically advertise prices at the clearinghouse, and
that brand advertising be su¢ ciently expensive that ￿rms do not ￿nd it in their interest to
use this channel exclusively. For this reason, we shall assume:
Condition 1 ￿ 2 ￿ ￿
￿
￿ : ￿ < N￿1





Among other things, this condition rules out equilibria that are degenerate in the sense that
￿rms eschew the informational advertising channel and simply price at v: It is straightforward
to show that the set of parameter values satisfying Condition 1 is non-empty￿ even in the
limit as N goes to in￿nity.
11Recall that secure branding strategies maximize the mininum possible payo⁄ that can be imposed on a
player during the second-stage pricing game.
7We now provide a complete characterization of the set of symmetric equilibria arising
when Condition 1 holds. In the sequel, let ￿i denote the probability a ￿rm lists its price,
and use Fi (p) to represent the distribution of ￿rm i￿ s listed price.
Proposition 1 There exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria when brand and informa-
tional advertising is endogenous. In any symmetric equilibrium:
Each ￿rm chooses branding level a 2 [aL;aH], which generates




loyal consumers per ￿rm. The total measure of loyal customers in the market is B ￿ N￿ 2
(0;1): Each ￿rm lists its price on the price comparison site with probability
￿i = ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿
￿







and, conditional on listing, selects a price from the cumulative distribution function






(v ￿ p)￿ + ￿ N
N￿1





over the support [p0;v] where
p0 = m +
(v ￿ m)￿ +
￿
(N￿1)N
(1 ￿ (N ￿ 1)￿)
:
Firms that do not list a price at the price comparison site charge a price of pi = v on their
own websites. Each ￿rm earns equilibrium pro￿ts of




Proposition 1, which is proved in Appendix A, shows that multiple equilibria arise in the
presence of endogenous branding. Nonetheless, all of the equilibria have the property that
branding e⁄orts by ￿rms convert some but not all consumers into loyals; in equilibrium, there
remain 1 ￿ B > 0 shoppers who purchase from the ￿rm charging the lowest price listed at
the comparison site. This prediction appears consistent with empirical ￿ndings that some,
but not all, online consumers buy at the lowest listed price. Note, however, that equilibrium
8advertising and pricing strategies, as well as ￿rms￿pro￿ts, are independent of the parameter
describing the search behavior of loyals.
The equilibria identi￿ed above share features present in the models of Varian, Rosenthal,
Narasimhan, and Baye-Morgan￿ as well as some important di⁄erences. Similar to all of
these models, equilibria in the present model require any ￿rm listing a price on the price
comparison site to use a pricing strategy that prevents rivals from being able to systematically
predict the price o⁄ered to consumers who enjoy the information posted at the site (hence the
distributional strategy, F (p)). Like Baye-Morgan, our model permits ￿rms to endogenously
determine whether to utilize the price comparison site (the other models constrain all ￿rms
to list prices at the site with probability one, and Baye-Morgan essentially show this is not
an equilibrium when it is costly for ￿rms to list prices at the site). As a consequence, in
any equilibrium ￿rms must randomize the timing of price listings to preclude rivals from
systematically determining the number of listings at the price comparison site (hence, the
informational advertising propensity, ￿ 2 (0;1)).
In contrast to Narasimhan and Rosenthal, the present model relaxes the assumption that
￿rms are costlessly endowed with an exogenous number of brand-loyal consumers. In the
present model, a ￿rm that spends nothing to promote its ￿brand￿or ￿service￿in the face of
positive expenditures by rivals enjoys no loyal consumers. In contrast to Varian and Baye-
Morgan, the present model does not impose the assumption that all consumers view the
products sold by di⁄erent ￿rms to be identical; indeed, in equilibrium, each ￿rm enjoys a
strictly positive measure of loyal consumers￿ thanks to the positive level of branding activity
that arises in equilibrium. As we will discuss below, this implies that the price comparison
site attracts fewer consumers than in the Baye-Morgan model. Expressed di⁄erently, the
branding e⁄orts of ￿rms reduce the tra¢ c enjoyed by the ￿information gatekeeper￿operating
the price comparison site.
Another di⁄erence between these models and the present model is that, in the former,
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium while, in the latter, endogenous branding leads to a
continuum of symmetric equilibria. The presence of a continuum of equilibria gives rise to a
coordination problem: how do ￿rms determine which ￿branding equilibrium￿to play? The
set of symmetric equilibria can be payo⁄-ordered from highest (a = aL) to lowest (a = aH);
9and the equilibria di⁄er in terms of the payo⁄risk to which ￿rms are exposed. In this respect,
these equilibria resemble those of the coordination games studied both theoretically and
experimentally by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990). They ￿nd experimental evidence
that subjects tend to adopt secure strategies when faced with coordination games of this
type; thus, it seems natural to compare the symmetric equilibria identi￿ed in Proposition 1
in terms of their security properties.
Notice that, when rivals choose branding levels aj = a in the ￿rst stage, the lowest payo⁄
that can be imposed on ￿rm i is
E￿
secure
i = (v ￿ m) ￿ ￿ (ai;A￿i) ￿ ￿ai:
That is, ￿rm i can do no worse than to eschew informational advertising (￿i = 0) and charge
the monopoly price to its loyal customers (pi = v) regardless of its perceptions about the







(N ￿ 1)a + ai
+ ￿ai
￿
(v ￿ m) ￿ ￿ai:




(ai + (N ￿ 1)a)
2 + ￿
￿
(v ￿ m) ￿ ￿ = 0: (5)
It is routine to show that these ￿rst-order conditions imply:
Proposition 2 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in secure branding strategies,
denoted a￿ 2 (aL;aH). Speci￿cally, (1) ￿rms choose brand advertising levels
ai = a
￿ ￿ ￿
(N ￿ 1)(v ￿ m)







N￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)￿
N (￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)￿)
￿
loyal consumers per ￿rm; and (2) ￿rms follow the second stage pricing and informational
advertising strategies described in Proposition 1.
For future reference, we let B￿ = N￿
￿ and use ￿￿;F ￿; p￿
0 and E￿￿ to denote the relevant
second-stage components of the equilibrium identi￿ed in Proposition 2. Together, these
components comprise what we shall hereafter refer to as an a￿ equilibrium.
103.1 Asymptotics
We now examine characteristics of online markets where an arbitrarily large number of ￿rms
compete. We ￿rst show, in Proposition 3, that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium level
of brand advertising converging to the a￿ equilibrium as N ! 1: That is, the coordination
problem is less severe in ￿large￿online markets: all symmetric equilibria are arbitrarily close
to the equilibrium identi￿ed in Proposition 2. This proposition is proved in Appendix A as
well.
Proposition 3 In any symmetric equilibrium, ￿rst-stage branding levels converge to a￿ as
the number of competing ￿rms (N) grows arbitrarily large. Formally, let haN;￿N;FNi be an
arbitrary sequence of symmetric equilibria. Then
(1) limN!1 aN = limN!1 a￿; and
(2) lim N!1 NaN = limN!1 Na￿ =
￿(v￿m)
￿￿￿(v￿m):
Next, we show that the unique limit equilibrium is nontrivial in the sense that it displays
both price dispersion and ￿nite numbers of ￿rms (in expectation) using the informational
advertising channel. First, note that the number of potential competitors, N, generally
exceeds the actual number of ￿rms listing prices at any instant in time. In particular, given
that each ￿rm lists a price with probability ￿￿; the actual number of listings is a binomial
random variable with mean,
n = N￿
￿ < N:








This implies that, in markets where N is large, each ￿rm enjoys a negligible number of loyal
consumers and essentially earns zero economic pro￿ts. Thus, the environment we study in
this section shares two features of competitive markets: (1) each ￿rm is small relative to the
total market, and (2) ￿rms earn zero equilibrium pro￿ts.
As we will see, however, even though ￿rms earn zero economic pro￿ts in the limit, the
resulting equilibrium does not entail marginal cost pricing. In fact, prices remain dispersed
11and exceed marginal cost with probability one when the number of competitors becomes
arbitrarily large. The reason stems from the fact that even though each ￿rm engages in








￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)￿
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￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)￿
:
It is useful to note that, since BL < 1; a positive measure of shoppers remain in the mar-
ket even as the number of competing ￿rms engaging in branding grows arbitrarily large.






(v ￿ m)((1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)￿)
￿(￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)￿)
￿
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(v ￿ m)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ N￿aH)
￿
= (v ￿ m)
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)
￿ ￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)
￿
by Condition 1. In other words, even in online markets where 10;000 or more ￿rms could
potentially list prices, the actual number of listings at any given point in time can be modest
in size.
Finally, note that prices remain dispersed and above marginal cost even as the number
of ￿rms grows arbitrarily large. The limiting distribution of advertised prices is given by
F






















0 = m +
￿(￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)￿
:
To summarize:
12Proposition 4 In online markets where an arbitrarily large number of ￿rms endogenously
engage in both brand and informational advertising:
(1) The average number of prices listed at the price comparison site is ￿nite and is given
by ￿ nL:
(2) The aggregate demand for brand advertising is ￿nite and given by AL.
(3) A non-negligible fraction of shoppers, 1 ￿ BL > 0, remain in the market.
(4) Prices listed at the comparison site are dispersed according to F L on a non-degenerate






It follows immediately that in online markets where the number of ￿rms is arbitrarily
large there is a unique symmetric dispersed price equilibrium.
3.2 Comparative Statics
In light of Propositions 2 and 3 as well as the limit results in the previous section, it is of
some interest to examine comparative static properties of the a￿ equilibrium. Our analy-
sis includes an assessment of the impact of endogenous branding on the payo⁄s of relevant
market participants￿ ￿rms, loyals, shoppers, and the ￿gatekeeper￿operating the price com-
parison site. We also study the e⁄ects of endogenous branding on the equilibrium level of
price dispersion in online markets. Some of the intuition provided in this section is based on
the comparative statics summarized below (Appendix A provides the relevant mathematical
details).
Variable ￿ ￿ ￿ N ￿ v m
E￿￿ + 0 0 ￿ + + ￿
a￿ + + ￿ ￿ 0 + ￿
￿
￿ + + ￿ ￿ 0 + ￿
B￿ + + ￿ + 0 + ￿
p￿
0 + + ￿ ? + + ?
￿￿ ￿ ￿ + ? ￿ ? ?
Firm Pro￿ts
Do ￿rms bene￿t, in equilibrium, from their costly branding activities? Or do their incen-
tives to promote their brands or services stem from an ￿oligopolistic lock-in￿(see Tauber,
131970), such that the overall pro￿ts of ￿rms are lower than would arise if the ￿rms could cred-
ibly commit to spend nothing on branding? On the one hand, when the brand expansion
parameter (￿) is large, branding might be bene￿cial overall in that the mass of shoppers is
reduced and hence the incentives to compete on price are blunted. On the other hand, when
the main e⁄ect of brand advertising is brand stealing (i.e., ￿ is large relative to ￿), then one
might imagine the e⁄ects going in the opposite direction and ￿rms bene￿ting collectively
from a ban on advertising.
To compare the magnitude of these two e⁄ects, recall from Proposition 2 that the equi-
librium pro￿ts of a representative ￿rm are
E￿















In contrast, when ￿rms can credibly commit not to engage in branding, equilibrium
pro￿ts are:12
NE￿





Proposition 5 In an a￿ equilibrium, the ability to create brand-loyal consumers (at positive
cost) decreases industry expected pro￿ts by
NE￿
0 ￿ NE￿







compared to the case where ￿rms can credibly commit to not engage in brand advertising.
Proposition 5 shows that the option to engage in brand advertising leaves all ￿rms strictly
worse o⁄. Interestingly, the pro￿tability of the industry is independent of the marginal bene￿t
of brand expansion (￿): Thus, even if the main e⁄ect of branding is to ￿grow￿the number of
loyal customers rather than stealing existing loyals from other ￿rms, it is still the case that
12To obtain this expression, notice that, when ￿rms are constrained to zero brand advertising, then, by
equation (1), ￿i = ￿
N for all i: We may then use these values of ￿i in the unique second stage equilibrium
strategies identi￿ed in Lemma 1 in Appendix A to obtain the pro￿t expression.
14adding the option of engaging in brand advertising leaves ￿rms individually and collectively
worse o⁄. The pro￿ts foregone due to this oligopolistic lock-in are greater in high-margin
(v ￿ m) markets, and in markets with more ￿rms.
The next proposition summarizes the e⁄ects of changes in the parameters of the model
on pro￿ts in an a￿ equilibrium.
Proposition 6 In an a￿ equilibrium, the equilibrium pro￿ts of ￿rms are independent of
the cost of brand advertising (￿); increasing in the cost of informational advertising (￿);
increasing in the e⁄ectiveness of brand stealing (￿); independent of the e⁄ectiveness of brand
expansion (￿); and decreasing in the number of competitors (N):
Why are equilibrium e-retailer pro￿ts independent of the marginal cost of brand advertis-
ing, ￿? After all, an increase in ￿ reduces each ￿rm￿ s equilibrium measure of loyal consumers
and a ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are increasing in its measure of loyal consumers. The answer is that
competition to create such consumers entails a long-term commitment of resources, and this
fully dissipates the higher pro￿ts that would be enjoyed were ￿rms exogenously endowed
with a larger fraction of loyal customers. This invariance result is, in fact, a general property
of many contests; see Glazer and Konrad (1999). In particular, this result obtains so long as
￿rm i￿ s fraction of loyals may be written as ￿i = G(ai;A￿i)+￿ai, where G is homogeneous
of degree zero in ￿rms￿branding e⁄orts.
In contrast, expected pro￿ts are increasing in ￿rms￿costs of listing prices on the gate-
keeper￿ s comparison site (￿). These costs drive a wedge between the expected pro￿ts earned
from listing prices in the online market and those from not listing at the gatekeeper￿ s site.
Higher listing fees reduce equilibrium advertising propensities (￿￿), which lessens price com-
petition and results in higher equilibrium pro￿ts.
Brand versus Informational Advertising
The model also sheds light on interrelations between two di⁄erent types of advertising
strategies. As would be expected, each ￿rm￿ s demand for brand and price advertising (a￿
and ￿￿, respectively) is decreasing in price (￿ and ￿, respectively). The demand for brand
advertising is an increasing function of both the direct (￿) and brand-stealing (￿) parameters.
15The model predicts that the incentives to create loyal consumers are stronger in markets
where it is relatively easy (markets with higher ￿ or ￿) or where it is less costly (markets
with lower ￿) to engage in branding. As a consequence, both the individual and aggregate
measure of loyal consumers (￿
￿ and B￿, respectively) will be larger in markets where it is
easier or less costly to induce consumers to become loyal to a given ￿rm.
Brand advertising is a substitute for informational advertising; increases in the unit cost of
brand advertising (￿) induce ￿rms to increase their propensities to run price advertisements
(￿￿). The intuition is that higher brand advertising costs result in less brand-building and
hence fewer loyal consumers. This reduces the pro￿ts ￿rms earn through tra¢ c at their own
websites, and therefore induces them to advertise prices more frequently at the comparison
site.
The converse is not true, however; an increase in the cost of informational advertising
has no e⁄ect on ￿rms￿demand for branding e⁄orts: @a￿=@￿ = 0. The asymmetric cross
price e⁄ects stem from the asymmetric manner in which ￿ and ￿ are paid. Listing fees (￿)
are paid only when a ￿rm lists prices at the gatekeeper￿ s site, while brand advertising costs
(￿) are incurred regardless.
These ￿ndings are summarized in
Proposition 7 In an a￿ equilibrium, demand for brand advertising is decreasing in the mar-
ginal cost of brand advertising (￿); independent of the cost of informational advertising (￿);
and increasing in its e⁄ectiveness (￿;￿): Demand for informational advertising is decreas-
ing in the cost of listing a price on the comparison site (￿), increasing in the cost of brand
advertising (￿); and decreasing in the e⁄ectiveness of brand advertising (￿;￿):
Implications for Price Comparison Sites
One of the implications of endogenous branding in oligopolistic online markets is that,
in an a￿ equilibrium, brand advertising expenditures result in a fraction B￿ > 0 of loyal
consumers, and ￿B￿ of these directly visit the websites of individual sellers rather than
utilizing the gatekeeper￿ s site. In Baye and Morgan (2001), the gatekeeper enjoys tra¢ c
from all consumers (due to its incentive to set consumer subscription fees low). By allowing
￿rms to endogenously choose branding levels, we see that ￿rms have an incentive to create
16loyal consumers, which reduces tra¢ c at the gatekeeper￿ s site to 1 ￿ ￿B￿. Thus, branding
activities by ￿rms have adverse e⁄ects on the ￿gatekeeper￿running the price comparison
site.
While we have taken the fee structure of the price comparison site (￿) as exogenous, the
reality is that fee-setting is a strategic variable for the site￿ s owner. How does the presence of
endogenous branding alter fee-setting decisions? Can the ￿gatekeeper￿alter its fee structure
to bring consumers back to its site?
The answer to the second question turns out to be no. Indeed, an important implication
of Proposition 7 is that B￿ (the aggregate fraction of loyal consumers) is independent of the
gatekeeper￿ s fees (￿). With this result in hand, one can easily tackle the ￿rst question: Since
the gatekeeper can do nothing through its fee structure to a⁄ect the aggregate measure
of loyals, optimal advertising fees are identical to the case where branding is exogenous.
Mitigation of the ￿tra¢ c diverting￿e⁄ects of branding would seem to require an additional
tool on the part of the gatekeeper, such as its own branding e⁄orts aimed at creating loyalty
to the price comparison site.
Levels of Prices and Dispersion
We close this section with a look at how endogenous branding by ￿rms in￿ uences the level
of prices and the price dispersion observed in online markets. Notice that, when there are n
prices listed on the comparison site, the average price paid by shoppers is the expectation
of the lowest of n draws from the distribution of advertised prices. In contrast, the average
price paid by loyals is simply the average price. Thus, shoppers pay lower average prices
than loyal consumers. Our next proposition permits us to examine how branding a⁄ects the
average prices paid by shoppers and loyals.
Proposition 8 In any symmetric equilibrium, the distribution of advertised prices in mar-
kets where ￿rms create more loyal consumers ￿rst-order stochastically dominates that in
markets where ￿rms create fewer loyal consumers.
Proposition 8, which is proved in Appendix A, implies that both the average price and,
for a given number of price listings, the expected minimum price listed at a price comparison
17site are increasing in the branding e⁄orts of ￿rms. What implications does this have on
expected transaction prices?
To answer this question, ￿rst recall that the frequency with which a given seller advertises
its price at the comparison site (￿) is decreasing in branding; thus, increases in branding
lead to a decrease in the expected number of price listings on the site. Next, note that the
expected transaction price of loyals is a weighted average of the expected advertised price
and the unadvertised price (v), where the weight is simply the probability a seller advertises
its price. Since the expected price conditional on listing increases and the probability of
listing decreases with increased branding, the average transaction price for loyals is higher
with increased branding. The expected transaction price for shoppers is simply the weighted
average of the expected minimum price conditional on the number of listings and v when
there are no listings on the site. Since, for a given number of listings, the expected minimum
price is higher with increased branding and the distribution of the number of listings is
lower with increased branding, it follows that the expected transaction price to shoppers
also increases with increased branding. To summarize:
Corollary 1 Heightened branding activity raises the expected transaction prices for all con-
sumers.
Next, we turn to the impact of branding on the level of online price dispersion. Recall
that an a￿ equilibrium entails a nondegenerate distribution of prices, as ￿rms stop short of
converting all consumers into loyals. One of the more widely used measures of dispersion for
online markets is the range, which we operationalize as the support of the price distribution.
This may be written (using Proposition 2) as
R
￿ = v ￿ p
￿
0 =




(1 ￿ (N ￿ 1)￿
￿)
:
This permits us to establish:
Proposition 9 In an a￿ equilibrium, equilibrium price dispersion, measured by the range,
is greater in online markets where (1) it is less costly to list prices at the gatekeeper￿ s site;
or (2) it is more costly or more di¢ cult to create loyal customers. More generally, in any
18symmetric equilibrium, equilibrium price dispersion, measured by the range, is greater in
markets where ￿rms create fewer loyal consumers.
Part (1) of this proposition follows from the fact that, other things equal, a reduction
in ￿ increases the pro￿tability of listing prices at the gatekeeper￿ s site but results in no
change in the total number of loyal consumers. Since in equilibrium ￿rms are indi⁄erent
between listing prices and not, ￿rms compete away these potential pro￿ts by pricing more
aggressively at the gatekeeper￿ s site. This reduces the lower support of the price distribution,
thus increasing the range in prices.
Part (2) stems from the impact of reduced branding incentives on the total number of
loyal consumers in the online marketplace. Increases in ￿ (or decreases in ￿ and/or ￿) induce
each ￿rm to spend less on branding. In equilibrium, this reduces the total number of loyal
consumers in the market, thereby heightening competition for the resulting larger number of
shoppers. This heightened competition reduces the lower support of the price distribution
and again the price range increases. In short, higher levels of price dispersion (measured by
the range) are associated with more competitive pricing online.
4 Empirical Analysis
To gauge the potential usefulness of the model for organizing the pricing patterns observed
in online markets, we conclude by highlighting several testable implications of the theory.
Then, we empirically examine these predictions using data from a leading price comparison
site.
We begin by considering price dispersion. It is worth noting that even in markets where
there are no branding activities (when ￿ = 0), the model predicts that prices are nonetheless
dispersed: The range of observed prices is predicted to be non-degenerate even for products
in which there are no loyal consumers.
Recall that Proposition 9 implies that the range in prices, de￿ned as the di⁄erence be-
tween the upper and lower supports of the equilibrium price distribution, is decreasing in
￿rms￿branding activities. While one cannot directly observe the upper and lower supports of
the distribution, one can observe the sample range, which is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between
19the highest and lowest prices listed on the comparison site. In Appendix B, we show that
for calibrated parameter values of the model, the sample range is also decreasing in ￿rms￿
branding activities (see Figure 1). Thus,
Prediction 1 All else equal, in markets where brand advertising intensity is higher, price
dispersion is lower.
Next, recall that Proposition 8 implies that advertised prices are stochastically ordered.
Hence, the average price listed at the price comparison site, as well as the average minimum
price, is an increasing function of ￿rms￿branding intensities. Thus,
Prediction 2 All else equal, in markets where brand advertising is higher, average listed
prices are also higher.
Prediction 3 All else equal, in markets where brand advertising is higher, the average min-
imum listed price is also higher.
The economic motivation for focusing on these two predictions stems from the fact that
the average listed price and the average minimum price are related to the prices paid by
loyal consumers and shoppers. Other things equal, higher average listed prices imply higher
transactions prices for loyal consumers, and higher average minimum prices imply higher
prices paid by shoppers who purchase products online. Note that the di⁄erence in these
two average prices re￿ ects the average savings of a consumer who purchases at the ￿best￿
listed price rather than the average listed price. Thus, Ep ￿ Epmin provides one measure of
the value of the price information provided by a price comparison site. The calibrations in
Appendix B also imply that this measure of the value of information is decreasing in ￿rms￿
branding activities (see Figure 1). Thus,
Prediction 4 All else equal, in markets where brand advertising intensity is higher, the
value of price information is lower.
4.1 Data
To examine these predictions, we assembled a dataset for 90 of the best-selling products
sold at Shopper.com during the period from 21 August 2000 to 22 March 2001. During this
20period, Shopper.com was the top price comparison site for consumer electronics products
(including speci￿c brands of printers, PDAs, digital cameras, software, and the like). A
consumer wishing to purchase a speci￿c product (identi￿ed by a unique part number) may
query the site to obtain a page view that includes a list of sellers along with their advertised
price. ￿Shoppers￿can easily sort prices from lowest to highest and, with a few mouse clicks,
order the product from the ￿rm o⁄ering the lowest price. ￿Loyals,￿on the other hand, can
easily sort sellers alphabetically or scan the page for their preferred ￿rm￿ s logo and click
through to purchase the item from that ￿rm.
We used a program written in PERL to download all the information returned in a page
view for each of the products each day, which amounted to almost 300,000 observations
over the period. While we have been tracking daily online prices and advertising for the
top 1,000 products from the late 1990s to the present (2004), several factors led us to focus
on the time period and products in the present study. During these seven months (205
days), there is considerable cross-sectional and time series variation in the brand advertising
intensities of ￿rms. Since then, both the online strategies of ￿rms and the structure of
the Shopper.com site have evolved in ways that make it more di¢ cult to study the impact
of branding on levels of price dispersion. Today there is less cross-sectional variation in
branding (many more ￿rms advertise their logos at Shopper.com), and product searches at
Shopper.com now return mixtures of new and refurbished products. This makes it di¢ cult
to determine whether any observed changes in price dispersion stem from increased product
heterogeneity (comparing new versus used product prices) or increased brand advertising by
￿rms. In contrast, during the seven months in the present study, Shopper.com treated new
and refurbished versions of otherwise identical products as di⁄erent products. In fact, all of
the 90 products in our sample are new products (see Appendix C for a complete description
of the products).
During the period of our study, ￿rms uploaded their prices into Shopper.com￿ s database,
which then fetched the uploaded data at speci￿ed times twice each day. Thus, daily pricing
decisions re￿ ect simultaneous moves. Moreover, there is a minimum twelve hour lag for
any ￿rm to ￿answer￿ a pricing move by its rival owing to the upload/refresh cycle. To
advertise a product price, a merchant was required to pay a ￿xed fee of $1,000 to set up
21an account at Shopper.com, plus an additional fee of $100 per month. This fee structure
provides merchants incentives to post accurate prices; a ￿rm advertising a bogus price in
an attempt to lure customers to its own website would generate many quali￿ed leads, but
would likely alienate potential customers and incur additional costs.13 We also veri￿ed the
accuracy of prices via an audit; more than 96 percent of the prices audited at Shopper.com
were accurate within $1.
In addition to Predictions 1-4, the equilibrium characterization o⁄ered in Proposition
1 suggests a number of other stylized facts about equilibrium pricing and listing decisions
on the comparison site. These implications, which are shared with many ￿clearinghouse
models￿(see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2004), have been shown to be consistent with
pricing patterns observed at Shopper.com as well as other price comparison websites. These
include: (a) ubiquitous and persistent price dispersion using a variety of price dispersion
measures; (b) turnover in the identity of the ￿rm o⁄ering the lowest price; (c) discontinuities
in a ￿rm￿ s demand above and below the lowest price o⁄ered by a rival; (d) turnover in the
identities of the ￿rms listing on the site (￿ < 1 ). Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (forthcoming)
o⁄er a survey of these and other empirical ￿ndings related to clearinghouse models. In light
of the existing evidence, we focus on Predictions 1-4, which are unique to the introduction
of branding decisions.
Table 1 provides basic summary statistics for these data averaged over all products and
dates; henceforth, product-dates.14 On average, 29 ￿rms listed prices for each product and,
on average, 8.29 percent of these ￿rms advertised using a logo along with their price listing.
While the average price of a product was $458.86, there is considerable variation in the prices
di⁄erent ￿rms charge for a given product. The average lowest price is $387.58, while the
average highest price charged is $555.11. The average level of price dispersion is substantial,
with an average range of $167.53. As shown in Figure 2, the average range is fairly stable
and quite sizeable during the period of our study.
13 The $100 monthly fee entitled sellers to up to 200 free clickthroughs from consumers per month. Sellers
who exceed this threshold incur a cost on the order of 50 cents per clickthrough.
14 The number of product-dates listed in Table 1 is less than what simple math would suggest (90 products
￿ 205 days = 18,400 product dates) due to product life-cycle e⁄ects. That is, products naturally drop out
of the sample over time due to the introduction of new models or product upgrades.
224.2 Estimation Strategy and Results
The theory presented above suggests that, for each product i and date t; the range (Rit) and
average prices (Epit and Epmin;it) are nonlinear functions of product characteristics (such as
the marginal cost of the product, mit), consumer demand characteristics (such as vit), the
level of branding (or alternatively, ￿it); and the number of ￿rms in the market for product i
in period t (Nit). For example, using the distribution of advertised prices in an a￿ equilibrium
and integrating by parts yields the following structural expression for the expected advertised
price of product i in period t as a function of the relevant explanatory variables:


































In light of the gross nonlinearities involved￿ and the fact that we only have proxies for
some potentially important explanatory variables￿ our estimation strategy is to attempt to
isolate the impact of branding on the variables of interest (Predictions 1-4) by controlling
for other variables that theory suggests might in￿ uence the observed levels of price disper-
sion, average prices, and value of information. In what follows, we estimate a logarithmic
￿rst-order Taylor￿ s series approximation of the nonlinear functional forms for the expected
price, minimum price, and range of prices for product i at time t. Speci￿cally, in light of
the cross-sectional time series nature of our data, we use product dummies to control for
the fact that consumers are likely to have very di⁄erent reservation prices (vit) for di⁄er-
ent products and ￿rms most likely incur di⁄erent marginal costs (mit) in selling di⁄erent
products. To further control for potential heterogeneities in demand across products, we
also include dummy variables for product popularity. Among other things, this controls for
possibility that consumers have higher reservation prices for popular products, as well as the
possibility that ￿rms are more eager to sell such products. In order to control for the possi-
bility that the general costs of e-retailing, the number of consumers with Internet access, or
overall consumer demand for consumer electronics products (and hence reservation prices)
temporally varied during the period of our study, we also include date dummies to control
for potential systematic temporal di⁄erences in reservation prices and/or ￿rms￿cost. One of
23the advantages of the size of our dataset is that it permits us to include 205 date dummies
for each day in our sample, 100 dummy variables to control for product popularity (the
most popular product, the second most popular product, and so on), as well as 90 product
dummies for each product in our sample.
The measure of branding used in our analysis is logo branding, and is based on the
classical marketing de￿nition in Keller (2002).15 Speci￿cally, for each product-date, we
compute the percentage of ￿rms that paid Shopper.com to display a logo along with their
price. Even though branding decisions by individual ￿rms did not tend to change during the
period of our study (consistent with the assumed two-stage structure of our model), there is
substantial variation in the use of logos across products and over time (time variation occurs
because, as predicted by the model, individual ￿rms￿listing decisions vary over time and
thus the observed fraction of ￿rms displaying logos on any particular product-date varies).
The model predicts that dispersion should be lower and average prices higher for products
in which logos are more prevalent. To control for unobserved variation in branding across
di⁄erent products, as well as other factors that might also in￿ uence levels of dispersion and
prices, all speci￿cations include product dummies to absorb all other sources of variation
across products.16
We note that, while the number of potential ￿rms is unobservable, it is statistically related
to the observed number of listings on a given date. For this reason, we use the number of
listings for product i on date t as a proxy for Nit: It is important to stress, however, that
while the theoretical model presented above is an oligopoly model in which the number of
sellers is taken to be exogenous, we are sympathetic to the possibility that ￿rms￿decisions
to enter the online market for a particular product might be endogenous. Unfortunately,
15￿A brand is a name, term, sign, symbol, or combination of them that is designed to identify the goods or
services of one seller or group of sellers and to di⁄erentiate them from those of competitors.￿(Keller (2002,
page 152).
16The majority of ￿rms in our sample are privately held, and thus, the total amount of money ￿rms spent
on all other types of branding activities is unobservable. It is important to stress that even though unob-
served branding activities are likely to be very substantial, the reported parameter estimates are nonetheless
unbiased due to the inclusion of product dummies. However, note that the coe¢ cients on branding capture
the e⁄ects of logo branding￿ not the e⁄ect of all branding activities. This magnitude of any branding e⁄ects
are thus likely to be conservative; if there is a systematic relation between the use of logo-branding and
levels of prices and dispersion, then one would expect even larger e⁄ects were one able to observe a broader
measure of branding.
24we do not have available instruments to correct for this potential endogeneity. However,
the potential problem is mitigated to some extent by the fact that we include product rank
dummies (which control to some extent for the possibility that more popular products attract
more ￿rms) and by the fact that every ￿rm at Shopper.com must make its period t pricing
decisions before it knows how many other ￿rms have decided to compete on that date. Since
a necessary condition for listing the price of a given product on a given date is that the ￿rm
paid the $100 monthly ￿entry fee￿which merely gives it the opportunity to list and update
its price daily for 30 days, to the extent that the number of potential sellers of product i on
date t is endogenous, some might argue that such entry decisions are determined well before
period t pricing decisions.
With these caveats, we turn to the data analysis. In Tables 2-5 we report semi-log
regression results that summarize the estimated impact of branding on, respectively, the
sample range, average price, average minimum price, and the value of information.17 For the
reasons discussed above, all speci￿cations include product dummies to control for unobserved
components of branding and other factors that might give rise to systematic di⁄erences in the
levels of prices across di⁄erent products. We also include a variety of other controls to account
for the impact of market structure, product life cycles, and other factors. Standard errors
have been corrected for possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the procedure
described in Newey and West (1987). In each table, Model 1 represents a baseline regression
in which the dependent variable associated with product i at time t is regressed on branding
activity, the number of ￿rms listing prices on that date, and product dummies. Models 2
through 4 add controls for nonlinear number of ￿rm e⁄ects, product popularity dummies,
and date dummies, respectively. Popularity dummies are based on Shopper.com￿ s Product
Rank (which ranges from 1 to 100 for the products in our sample).
Table 2 examines whether price dispersion varies systematically with ￿rms￿branding
e⁄orts. Here, the dependent variable is the (log) sample range. In all speci￿cations, the
results indicate that, at the 1 percent signi￿cance level, price dispersion negatively covaries
with branding. These results indicate that an increase in the fraction of logos from 8.29% to
9.29% decreases the price range by $2.05 in Model 1 and $3.20 in Model 4. These ￿ndings
17The results are robust to regressions based on levels rather than logs.
25are consistent with Prediction 1.
Table 3 summarizes results for the (log) average price regressions. With the exception
of Model 4, the estimates suggest that average prices positively covary with branding. The
semi-log regression coe¢ cients imply that an increase in the fraction of logos from the mean
(8.29%) to 9.29% increases the average price by 42 cents in Model 1 and increases it by
41 cents in Model 3. The most general speci￿cation, Model 4, is at odds with Prediction
2. While the coe¢ cient associated with branding is negative in that speci￿cation, it is not
statistically signi￿cant.
Table 4 summarizes results for the (log) minimum price regressions. Minimum prices
positively covary with branding and are signi￿cant at the one percent level in Models 1
through 3. These results indicate that an increase in the fraction of logos from 8.29% to
9.29% increases average minimum prices by 99 cents in Model 1 and $1.02 in Model 3.
These results are consistent with Prediction 3; however, the coe¢ cient associated in the
most general speci￿cation, Model 4, remains positive but loses statistical signi￿cance.
Why does the coe¢ cient associated with branding in the most general speci￿cation lose
signi￿cance and, in the case of the average price regressions, change sign? One possibility is
that logo ads constitute only a small component of a ￿rm￿ s portfolio of branding activities,
and the inclusion of the date dummies absorb the remaining variation in the data. The key
here is that the use of logos decreases over time in our sample. At the same time, price
levels decline over the course of the sample, presumably due to the relatively short life cycles
of consumer electronics products. Absent date dummies, the branding coe¢ cient captures
this time variation in prices thus giving rise to the positive coe¢ cients in Models 1 through
3. Model 4 illustrates the importance of controlling for product life-cycle e⁄ects. Adding
this control absorbs the time series variation in overall prices, reducing the precision of the
estimated branding coe¢ cient.
Notice that this issue does not arise in Model 4 of Table 2. In particular, this speci￿cation
is based on the di⁄erence in the highest and lowest prices at each product date. To the extent
that the life cycle e⁄ects for a given product are similar for both the highest and lowest prices,
di⁄erencing the data eliminates individual product life cycle e⁄ects. Thus, the speci￿cation
in Model 4 of Table 2 allows for di⁄erences in life cycle e⁄ects across products, while that in
26Model 4 of Tables 3 and 4 do not.
Table 5 summarizes the results for the (log) value of information regressions. Since
the value of information is the di⁄erence between the average and minimum price for each
product date, this speci￿cation (like that in Table 2) allows for heterogenous product life
cycle e⁄ects. The coe¢ cient on branding indicates that the value of information negatively
covaries with branding in all four speci￿cations. The coe¢ cient estimates are signi￿cant at
the 1% level￿ even in Model 4. These results indicate that an increase in the fraction of
logos from 8.29% to 9.29% decreases that value of price information at Shopper.com by $1.33
in Model 1 and $1.60 in Model 4. In short, all speci￿cations in Table 4 lead to results that
are consistent with Prediction 4: ￿rms￿branding e⁄orts appear to adversely a⁄ect the value
of the gatekeeper￿ s site.
The empirical evidence suggests that the level of dispersion and the value of price in-
formation in online markets is in￿ uenced by the branding activities of ￿rms. Our empirical
analysis, however, is limited by the absence of alternative theoretical models as well as
data limitations that preclude structural estimation. Indeed, while the empirical evidence
is broadly consistent with our theoretical model, it is important to stress that alternative
models may better organize the data. Likewise, alternative datasets might permit one to
probe other aspects of the theory and deal with some of the potential problems (such as
endogeneity) discussed above. The empirical results presented here suggest that future the-
oretical and empirical research along these lines might prove to be useful additions to the
literature.
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32A Mathematical Appendix
The proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 rely on a series of lemmas detailed below.





loyal customers and that ￿ 2
￿
0; N￿1
N (v ￿ m)(1 ￿ N￿)
￿
.
Then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in second stage game where:
Each ￿rm lists its price on the price comparison site with probability
￿i = ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿
￿







and, conditional on listing, selects a price from the cumulative distribution function






(v ￿ p)￿ + ￿ N
N￿1





over the support [p0;v] where
p0 = m +
(v ￿ m)￿ +
￿
(N￿1)N
(1 ￿ (N ￿ 1)￿)
:
Firms that do not list a price at the price comparison site charge a price of pi = v on their
own websites. Each ￿rm earns equilibrium pro￿ts of




Proof. By the usual price undercutting arguments, one can show that in any symmetric
equilibrium, the distribution of advertised prices (a) is atomless and contains no gaps, and
(b) has an upper support of v:
Let ￿ and F be candidates for the (symmetric) equilibrium propensity and distribution
of advertised prices, respectively. Then a seller that does not list (Li = 0) its price on the
comparison site earns expected pro￿ts of
E￿i (pjLi = 0) =
￿






which is clearly maximized at a price of v: Thus, conditional on not listing, the optimal price
is v; and the corresponding pro￿ts are
E￿i (Li = 0) =
￿





(v ￿ m) (11)
33In contrast, a seller that does list (Li = 1) a price of p 2 Support(F) on the comparison
site earns expected pro￿ts of
E￿i (pjLi = 1) =
 








j (1 ￿ ￿)
N￿1￿j (1 ￿ F (p))
j
!
(p ￿ m) ￿ ￿
Using the binomial theorem, this expression simpli￿es to:
E￿i (pjLi = 1) =
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ B)(1 ￿ ￿F (p))
N￿1
￿
(p ￿ m) ￿ ￿ (12)
for all p 2 Support(F):
Derivation of ￿. By assumption, ￿ 2
￿
0; N￿1
N (v ￿ m)(1 ￿ N￿)
￿
: We ￿rst show that
￿ 2 (0;1) in any symmetric equilibrium. By way of contradiction, suppose not. If ￿ = 0; no
other ￿rms list prices on the comparison site and a ￿rm that deviates by listing a price of v
on the comparison site earns (using equation (12))
(￿ + (1 ￿ B))(v ￿ m) ￿ ￿
> (￿ + (1 ￿ B))(v ￿ m) ￿
N ￿ 1
N








= E￿i (Li = 0);
which contradicts the hypothesis that ￿ = 0 is part of a symmetric equilibrium. On the
other hand, if ￿ = 1, a ￿rm that prices at (or slightly below) v earns expected pro￿ts of
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ B)(1 ￿ ￿F (v))
N￿1
￿
(v ￿ m) ￿ ￿
= ￿ (v ￿ m) ￿ ￿
< ￿ (v ￿ m) = E￿i (Li = 0):
Thus, if ￿ = 1, ￿rm i￿ s expected pro￿ts from not listing exceed those from listing, which
contradicts the hypothesis that ￿ = 1 is part of a symmetric equilibrium. We conclude that
￿ 2 (0;1):
Next, we establish ￿. Since ￿ 2 (0;1), equilibrium requires the equalization of equations
(11) and (12) for almost all p in the support of F: Noting that
lim
p"v
E￿i (pjLi = 1) =
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ B)(1 ￿ ￿)
N￿1
￿
(v ￿ m) ￿ ￿
34yields the following necessary condition for a symmetric equilibrium:
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ B)(1 ￿ ￿)
N￿1
￿










￿ = 1 ￿
￿￿
￿






in any symmetric equilibrium. Note that ￿ 2
￿
0; N￿1
N (v ￿ m)(1 ￿ B)
￿
implies ￿ 2 (0;1), as
required.
Derivation of F. In a symmetric equilibrium, each ￿rm must be indi⁄erent between
(a) charging a price of v and not listing at the price comparison site, and (b) listing any








(v ￿ m) =
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ B)(1 ￿ ￿F (p))
N￿1
￿
(p ￿ m) ￿ ￿: (13)
Solving for 1 ￿ ￿F (p) yields
1 ￿ ￿F (p) =
 
￿ (v ￿ p) + 1￿B
N (1 ￿ ￿)
N￿1 (v ￿ m) + ￿




It is a routine matter to verify that F is a well-de￿ned atomless cdf on [p0;v] ￿ [m;v], where
p0 = m +
(v ￿ m)￿ +
￿
(N￿1)N
(1 ￿ (N ￿ 1)￿)
:
To summarize, we have shown that F is a well-de￿ned, atomless cdf with support [p0;v]: Fur-
ther, since equation (13) is linear in (1 ￿ ￿F); it then follows that the solution is generically
unique.
Finally, notice that it is not pro￿table for a ￿rm to price below p0; since F is atomless, a
￿rm enjoys the same sales at a price of p0 as it does at any p < p0, and the markup is higher
at p0 than p < p0:
Thus, (￿;F) represent the unique symmetric pricing strategies at a price comparison site
when each seller enjoys ￿ loyal consumers. When each ￿rm has ￿ loyal customers (as is the
case when each ￿rm chooses brand advertising level a in the ￿rst stage), equilibrium pro￿ts







(v ￿ m) +
￿
N ￿ 1
￿ ￿a: ￿ (14)





(v ￿ m) +
￿





(v ￿ m) ￿ ￿z for all z:
Then ￿rst stage branding level, a; combined with the second stage pricing and informational
advertising strategies identi￿ed in Lemma 1 comprise a symmetric Nash equilibrium.












by Lemma 1. As usual, a player￿ s incentive to deviate from a in the ￿rst-stage depends
on beliefs regarding rivals￿second-stage response to such a deviation. In order to identify
the largest set of a￿ s that can be sustained as part of a Nash equilibrium, consider trigger
strategies (following a deviation from a) that result in the lowest possible deviation payo⁄s.





z + (N ￿ 1)a
+ ￿z
￿
(v ￿ m) ￿ ￿z; (15)
since such a player can always eschew the informational advertising channel and price at
v to its loyal customers. Trigger strategies that support the payo⁄s to a deviating ￿rm
given in equation (15) are as follows: Following a ￿rst-stage deviation by ￿rm i: Firm
j = i + 1(Mod N) employs the second stage strategy ￿j = 1 and





(v ￿ m) + ￿
￿
￿ z
z+(N￿1)a + 1 ￿ (￿ + (N ￿ 1)a￿)
￿
The remaining ￿rms k 6= j;i employ the second stage strategy ￿k = 0; pk = v: Thus, any
branding level a such that E￿ (a) ￿ E￿ (z) can be supported as a Nash equilibrium. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1
By Lemma 1, for any symmetric a the equilibrium in the second-stage pricing game is
unique. Thus it su¢ ces to show that the inequality contained in the statement of Lemma 2
holds if and only if a 2 [aL;aH]. For a given putative equilibrium, a; the deviation z that
maximizes equation (15) is
z (a) =
1
￿ ￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)
￿p
￿a(N ￿ 1)(v ￿ m)(￿ ￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)) ￿ (N ￿ 1)a(￿ ￿ ￿ (v ￿ m))
￿













z (a) + (N ￿ 1)a
+ ￿z (a)
￿
(v ￿ m) ￿ ￿z (a):
Substituting for z (a) and solving reveals that this inequality is satis￿ed if and only if a 2
[aL;aH]:￿
Proof of Proposition 3
Since aL ￿ aN ￿ aH, part (1) follows from the fact that limN!1 aL = limN!1 aN =












￿ ￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)
￿
Comparative Statics. We next verify the comparative statics provided in the text. Note
that
E￿











Hence, @E￿￿=@￿ > 0; @E￿￿=@￿ = @E￿￿=@￿ = 0; @E￿￿=@N < 0; @E￿￿=@￿ > 0; @E￿￿=@v >
0; and @E￿￿=@m < 0. Furthermore, since
a
￿ = ￿
(N ￿ 1)(v ￿ m)
N2 (￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)￿)
;
it is immediate that @a￿=@￿ > 0; @a￿=@￿ > 0; @a￿=@￿ < 0; @a￿=@￿ = 0; @a￿=@v > 0; and
@a￿=@m < 0. In addition,
@a￿
@N
= ￿(v ￿ m)￿
N ￿ 2








N￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)￿
N (￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)￿)
￿
> 0:
Hence, it is immediate that @￿
￿=@￿ > 0 and @￿




= ￿ (v ￿ m)￿
N ￿ 1






(v ￿ m)(N ￿ 1)






N￿ ￿ 2(v ￿ m)￿








N2 ((v ￿ m)￿ ￿ ￿)
2 > 0:
Finally, since B￿ = N￿
￿, all comparative statics for B￿ (save @B￿=@N) follow directly




= ￿ (v ￿ m)
￿
N2 (￿ ￿ (v ￿ m)￿)
> 0:
Since





(1 ￿ (N ￿ 1)￿
￿)
is increasing in ￿
￿, it follows (using the comparative statics for ￿
￿) that @p0=@￿ > 0; @p0=@￿ >
0; @p0=@￿ < 0; @p0=@￿ > 0; and @p0=@v > 0. However, since
￿
￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿
￿






is decreasing in B￿, it follows (using the comparative statics for B￿) that @￿￿=@￿ < 0;
@￿￿=@￿ < 0; @￿￿=@￿ > 0; and @￿￿=@￿ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 8
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(v ￿ p)(N ￿ 1) + ￿N2
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2 (p ￿ m)
2 < 0:
38We are now in a position to prove Proposition 8. Since ￿ is decreasing in ￿; it is su¢ cient
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where the inequality follows from the facts derived above. Since
@F(p)




(N￿￿1￿￿)2 > 0, the required stochastic ordering is established. ￿
B Calibration
In general, the sample range and the value of information are of ambiguous sign with respect
to changes in branding. As discussed in the text, we calibrated an a￿ equilibrium of the
model to infer the implied relationship between branding and price dispersion around the
mean values of our data. Speci￿cally, we approximated consumers￿maximal willingness to
pay by the average maximum price observed in our data; v = $555:11: We approximated
the number of price-sensitive consumers on the price comparison site based on estimates by
Brynjolfsson, Montgomery, and Smith (2003) for the 2000-2002 period; 1￿B￿ = :13. We set
the number of potential ￿rms at N = 68; which is the largest number of ￿rms listing prices
for any product in our dataset.18 The listing fee for posting a price at the comparison site is
calibrated at ￿ = $3:33, which is the average cost per day of listing a price at Shopper.com
during the period of our study.
Calibrating marginal cost is more involved. We assumed a 38.5% gross margin on the
average transaction price, which is based on the US Census Bureau￿ s estimate of the average
18Note that the average minimum price, one also needs an esitmate of the particular realization of the nu
39margin for Electronic Shopping and Mail Order Retailers (NAICS 4541).19 To obtain the
average transaction price, we supposed that 13% of customers bought items at the average
minimum price￿ that is, were shoppers in our terminology￿ while the reminder bought items
at the average price￿ that is were loyal customers; thus, B￿ = :87: The 13% ￿gure is based
on estimates by Brynjolfsson, Montgomery, and Smith (2003) for the percentage of Internet
users using price comparison sites over the 2000-2002 period. We set marginal cost at 61.5%
of the average transaction price in our sample, m = $274:91. This completely calibrates the
model.
Figure 1 displays calibrated values for the sample range and the value of information. As
the ￿gure shows, when the fraction of loyal customers is between 85 and 100%, as implied
by the Brynjolfsson, Montgomery and Smith study, both the sample range and value of
information are decreasing functions of the fraction of loyal consumers, as summarized in
Predictions 1 and 4. The empirical results in Tables 2 and 5 are consistent with Figure 1.
Expressed di⁄erently, the empirical results in Tables 2 and 5, along with the calibration in
Figure 1, suggest that less 15% of the consumers at Shopper.com actually buy at the lowest
listed price.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43Number of Products 90
Number of Dates 214
Number of Prices 291,039
Mean Std. Dev Median
Price
Average Price $458.86 $496.64 $325.94
Lowest Price $387.58 $412.07 $282.00
Highest Price $555.11 $586.76 $404.25
Advertising Levels
Number of Advertised Prices 29.07 17.23 29.00
Percentage of Listings with Logos 8.29% 6.49% 8.11%
Price Dispersion
Price Range $167.53 $229.75 $104.35
Total Observations
Product Summary Statistics
Table 1: Data Summary
441234
Branding -1.224 -1.290 -1.272 -1.912
   (4.31)**    (4.67)**    (4.72)**    (6.35)**
# of Firms 0.024 0.050 0.049 0.043
   (18.01)**    (13.02)**    (12.24)**    (9.80)**
(# of Firms)² 0.000 0.000 0.000
   (8.94)** (8.56)**    (6.60)**
Product Dummies yes yes yes yes
Popularity Dummies yes yes
Date Dummies yes
# of observations 9980 9980 9980 9980
Dependent variable: Log Range
Table 2: Log Range Regressions
Model
Notes: HAC adjusted t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
45Dependent variable: Log Average Price
1234
Branding 0.091 0.093 0.090 -0.069
   (3.37)**    (3.48)**    (3.43)**    (1.55)
# of Firms -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005
   (3.03)**    (1.98)*    (2.09)*    (5.63)**
(# of Firms)² 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
(1.39) (1.52)    (4.20)**
Product Dummies yes yes yes yes
Popularity Dummies yes yes
Date Dummies yes
# of observations 10013 10013 10013 10013
Model
Table 3: Log Average Price Regressions
Notes: HAC adjusted t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
46Dependent variable: Log Minimum Price 
1234
Branding 0.256 0.263 0.262 0.127
   (5.56)**    (5.79)**    (5.82)** (1.80)
# of Firms -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009
   (6.99)**    (5.18)**    (5.14)**    (8.76)**
(# of Firms)² 0.000 0.000 0.000
   (3.68)** (3.73)**    (6.91)**
Product Dummies yes yes yes yes
Popularity Dummies yes yes
Date Dummies yes
# of observations 10013 10013 10013 10013
Model
Table 4: Log Minimum Price Regressions
Notes: HAC adjusted t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
47Dependent variable: Log Value of Information
1234
Branding -1.870 -1.924 -1.902 -2.247
   (6.82)**    (7.13)**    (7.28)** (7.40)**
# of Firms 0.014 0.035 0.035 0.040
   (11.07)**    (9.08)**    (8.65)**    (9.19)**
(# of Firms)² 0.000 0.000 0.000
   (7.28)** (7.03)**    (7.99)**
Product Dummies yes yes yes yes
Popularity Dummies yes yes
Date Dummies yes
# of observations 9980 9980 9980 9980
Model
Table 5: Log Value of Information Regressions
Notes: HAC adjusted t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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